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Abstract
Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the
inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional
price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of
the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, not-
withstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge
towards the euro area level. Overall, inflation persistence has
declined significantly over the years, but there are still marked
differences between countries on this score. We conclude that
the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending sup-
port to the quest for further structural reforms in European la-
bour and product markets.
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1. Introduction
On January 1, 1999, the currencies of eleven member states of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) became irrevocably fixed. As a consequence,
the nominal exchange rate channel as a propagation mechanism of asymmet-
ric shocks within the euro area was shutdown. Since then, mean-reversion of
real exchange rates (or international competitiveness) across the euro area
relies exclusively on convergence of regional price levels. This paper ad-
dresses the empirical question whether or not such convergence is inherent
in the inflationary processes of member states, and if so, how fast it occurs.
A related issue is the extent to which price dynamics differ between coun-
tries as regards inflation persistence and the pass-through of changes in the
real exchange rate and domestic demand pressure. Such heterogeneity may
render the common monetary policy conducted by the European Central
Bank (ECB) suboptimal for (some) individual countries and is thereby a
potential cause of tension among Governing Council members of the ECB
(Aksoy et al., 2002). This imposes constraints on fiscal policies, which are
still in place to cope with regional inflation divergences. However, differ-
ences in national preferences may seriously hamper that kind of accommo-
dating behaviour by sovereign governments (Hughes Hallett and Weymark,
2001), notwithstanding the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, the Sta-
bility & Growth Pact, and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
Of course, such coordination failure will become less pressing as the real
economies of member states of EMU get more integrated. This stresses the
importance of completing the Internal Market by ongoing efforts at harmo-
nizing tax and benefit systems across national borders, at structurally re-
forming labour and product markets, etc. While this is clearly a long-term
challenge, some progress has been made during the past two decades, which
we try to detect empirically by assessing regional inflation dynamics in the
euro area over different time spans. This also allows us to test the proposi-
tion put forward by Taylor (2000) and others that the shape of the Phillips
curve tends to vary with the inflationary environment.
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Our empirical analysis is embedded in a simple New-Keynesian frame-
work, incorporating inertia — which are commonly seen as characteristic of
European labour and product markets (Gonenc et al., 2000) — and forward-
looking behaviour in the determination of inflation. The focus on regional
price adjustment within a monetary union is fairly novel, as most of the ex-
isting literature on inflation dynamics concentrates on monetarily sovereign
countries (e.g., in the context of assessing different strategies of monetary
policy). A further innovative aspect of our approach is that we allow and
test for convergence of expectations to the rate of inflation in the euro area
as a whole. Our evidence on this score is rather tentative, though, due to
some restrictive assumptions on expectation formation (especially prior to
the establishment of EMU).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section con-
tains our conceptual framework, which is put to the test empirically in sec-
tion 4, after a discussion of data issues in section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
Our starting point is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve as contain-
ed in the work of Svensson (1998) and Leitemo and Söderström (2001),
with domestic inflation predetermined one period:
where πt is the annualized domestic rate of inflation, measured as the differ-
(1)πt απt 1 (1 α) Et 1(πt 1) β Et 1(yt) γ Et 1(et) δ εt
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ; β > 0 ; γ < 0
ence of the (log) gdp-deflator (pt), yt is the output gap, et is the (log) real
exchange rate, εt is a white-noise supply shock, and E is an expectations op-
erator. The suffix t indicates the (quarterly) time period. The expectations of
yt and et, formed in period t-1, should be regarded as deviations from their
steady-state levels, which are assumed to be constant and to be captured by
the intercept δ for convenience. The real exchange rate is defined as:
(2)et st pt pt
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where st is the (log) spot exchange rate (in units of foreign currency per unit
of domestic currency), and pt* is the foreign (log) gdp-deflator. The pa-
rameters α, β, γ and δ may differ across countries. Of course, they may also
change over time due to shifts in wage negotiation models, opening-up of
product markets (both domestically and across borders), and so on.
For a theoretical underpinning of eq. (1), we refer to Svensson (1998,
Appendix C). He derives a macroeconomic supply function from a first-or-
der condition of an optimization problem for an open economy, adding in-
flation persistence along the lines of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). This last ex-
tension gives the equation its ‘Keynesian’ flavour of price-staggering, which
has recently been worked out by Taylor (2000) and Choudri and Hakura
(2001) in the context of marginal cost and exchange rate pass-through.
To see what EMU implies, consider the more extreme case in which s is
completely fixed. Then, the real exchange rate in eq. (1) acts as an equili-
brating mechanism in that it incites inflation as long as the domestic price
level is expected to lag behind the foreign price level (provided, of course,
that γ < 0).1 As a consequence, international price level differences are only
temporary. Clearly, it depends on the strength of the real exchange rate
channel (i.e., on γ) and on domestic inflation dynamics (notably α) how long
that adjustment process takes. The more integrated and dynamic the real
economies of countries are as regards product market competition, wage rate
determination and so on, the sooner equilibrium will be restored.
We intend to shed some light on this issue in the context of EMU by esti-
mating eq. (1) for five larger member states. This requires that certain as-
sumptions be made on the formation of expectations about future inflation,
the output gap and the real exchange rate. We assume that yt and et are ex-
pected to converge to their constant steady-state levels ( and ) accordingy e
to the adaptive mechanisms:
1 Note that the real exchange rates of member states of EMU (e) are still sub-
ject to changes in nominal exchange rates vis-a-vis the currencies of countries out-
side the euro area.
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Note that expectations are static in case κ = λ = 1.2 The expectation of one-
(3)Et 1(yt) κyt 1 (1 κ)y (0 ≤ κ ≤ 1)
(4)Et 1(et) λet 1 (1 λ)e (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1)
period ahead inflation in each member state of EMU is assumed to converge
to the expectation of one-period ahead inflation in the euro area as a whole,
Et-1(Πt+1), according to:
This is asymptotically consistent with the aforementioned hypothesis that re-
(5)Et 1(πt 1) µπt 1 (1 µ) Et 1(Πt 1) (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1)
gional price level differences within EMU tend to disappear in the long run.
The persistence coefficients κ, λ and µ may differ across countries, just like
(or rather in conjunction with) the parameters in eq. (1). Finally, we assume
that one-period ahead inflation in the euro area as a whole is expected to
converge to the constant rate Π*, representing the rate of inflation the Euro-
pean (system of) central banks consider(s) to be consistent with medium-
term price stability:
Upon substituting eqs. (3) to (6) into eq. (1), we arrive at the final esti-
(6)Et 1(Πt 1) νΠt 1 (1 ν)Π (0 ≤ ν ≤ 1)
mating form:
From the parameter restrictions, it follows that α1 + α2 ≤ 1. The larger α1
(7)πt α1πt 1 α2Πt 1 β yt 1 γ et 1 δ εt
0 ≤ α1 α µ αµ ≤ 1 ; 0 ≤ α2 (1 α1)ν ≤ 1 ; β βκ ;
γ γλ ; δ δ β (1 κ)y γ (1 λ)e (1 α1)(1 ν)Π
(hence, the smaller α2) and the smaller (in absolute value) are, the moreγ
2 We have explored more complicated schemes by adding several lagged differ-
ence terms to the equations (∆yt-i and ∆et-i respectively), but on the whole, this gave
inferior estimation results.
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persistent domestic inflation is, and the longer it takes until the country’s
price competitiveness is at par vis-a-vis other member states after it has been
hit by an asymmetric supply shock (ε). Thus, the estimates of α1, α2 and ,γ
taken in conjunction, tell us to what extent national economies in EMU have
really integrated. Incidentally, the significance of the domestic output gap
(i.e., the parameter ) is also indicative of the degree of economic regional-β
ism in inflation dynamics.
3. Data issues
We have obtained quarterly data from Datastream, covering the period
1980-2000, for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Lack of
consistent data over a sufficiently long period prevented us from considering
other member states of EMU as well. Inflation in the euro area is a weighted
average of the gdp-deflators for the constituent countries, with the euro area
prior to the establishment of EMU represented by the group of countries
participating in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.3 We have experi-
mented with several indicators of the output gap: deviations of real gdp from
trend, constructed by a HP(1600) filter, the rate of capacity utilization, the
unemployment rate and its inverse. The last proxy, implying a hyperbolic
Phillips curve, turned out to be superior throughout the sample of countries.
Forced by the (un)availability of data, we had to measure the real exchange
rate in terms of either consumer price deflators or unit labour costs, where
we would have preferred gdp-deflators.
Unit-root tests (both Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) show-
ed for each country that all but one series are stationary. The exception is
the real exchange rate based on unit labour costs, which led us to choose the
real exchange rate based on consumer price deflators as our measure of
international competitiveness. So, the preferred data set is consistent with
3 The obvious alternative is to identify Π prior to 1999 with German inflation,
but this gave implausible estimation results.
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Svensson’s (2001) prior that all variables in eq. (1) are stationary.
Studies by Gonenc et al. (2000) and Rich and Tracey (2000) suggest that
the persistence of domestic inflation is not fully captured by simply includ-
ing the quarterly lagged rate of inflation (πt-1) as a regressor. The reason is
that wage developments (especially in Europe) are largely governed by col-
lective labour agreements that are effective during a relatively long period of
time. Following Rudebusch (2000), we have experimented with more
complicated lag structures, and established that using lags of up to and in-
cluding eight quarters fits best for the countries considered.4 This confirms
the notion of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), elaborating on Taylor (1980), that
wage inertia extending over several quarters tend to translate into equally
severe inflation persistence.
4. Estimation results
Eq. (7) was fitted over the entire sample period (1980-2000) and over the
subperiod 1990-2000, for each country separately and for a panel of the five
countries. We used OLS (and SUR for the panels), with the covariance ma-
trix estimated by the method suggested by Newey and West (1987) to allow
for ARCH effects found in some equations. The results are recorded in table
1, together with some summary statistics.
As it turns out, inflation in most countries considered is primarily driven
by past inflation rates, with the real exchange rate playing a very limited
role (if any). This conclusion holds for both sample periods.5 As revealed
by the results of the pooled regressions (with only allowed to vary acrossδ
countries), the pass-through of changes in the real exchange rate to domestic
inflation has even declined over time (though not significantly). Recent re-
search by Taylor (2000) and others (Choudry and Hakura, 2001; Gagnon and
Ihrig, 2001) suggests that this is due to a shift towards an environment of
4 All pre-testing results are available from the authors upon request.
5 In the longer sample, is significant for France, but it has the wrong sign.γ
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lower inflation, whether or not induced by monetary policy. The argument
runs as follows. The extent to which firms pass through cost increases as
well as price increases at competing firms depends on their expectations
about the persistence of such increases. This perceived persistence is associ-
ated with the overall level of inflation, which is assumed to be indicative of
the pricing power of firms. And indeed, as appears from the last column of
table 1, average inflation has decreased markedly in most countries consid-
ered. Moreover, we find that the influence of domestic demand pressure on
inflation (i.e., the parameter ) has declined significantly over the years inβ
France, Italy and the Netherlands, which also supports Taylor’s hypothesis.
Remarkably, this is not revealed by the results of the pooled regressions,
suggesting that the assumption of constant slope coefficients across countries
is not entirely appropriate. It follows that national economies in EMU are
not perfectly integrated as regards price (and wage) formation, which cor-
roborates recent findings by Aksoy et al. (2002) and Fase (2002).
Notwithstanding this last conclusion, inflationary expectations in some
countries — Germany in particular — were based more and more on aver-
age European inflation as EMU got nearer. This emerges from a comparison
of the estimates of α1 and α2 between the two samples.6 Spain is found to
be most oriented towards Europe in this regard, already from the 1980s
onward, which is probably due to the fact that this country has the strongest
trade links with the rest of the euro area. Inflation persistence in France and
Italy has remained considerable through the years. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to go deeply into the possible causes behind this finding. We do
note, however, that those countries have the highest scores on product mar-
ket regulation in our sample, according to a recent study by the OECD (Ni-
coletti et al., 2001, pp. 43-44). This may have a bearing on the viability of
indexation and, hence, on price staggering. The Netherlands, on the other
6 Although the sum of these parameters exceeds unity in some cases, thereby
breaching the theoretical restriction, it does only significantly so in the case of
Spain in the longer sample (according to a Wald test). Furthermore, we had to re-
ject the hypothesis that ν in eq. (6) is uniform across countries.
- 8 -
hand, seems to have moved towards pretty sound inflation dynamics. The
most recent estimates of α1 and α2 for the Netherlands imply that Dutch in-
flation is largely governed by the perception of medium-term price stability
in the euro area (i.e., by Π*). Hence, the effects of exogenous price shocks
on inflation tend to be short-lived in the Netherlands.
5. Concluding remarks
This study was primarily inspired by curiosity about the degree and speed
of price level convergence across EMU, after a member state has been hit
by an asymmetric supply shock. Our finding that regional inflation rates in
the euro area are not significantly affected by deviations of real exchange
rates from their steady-state levels does not bode well for a spontaneous —
let alone rapid — convergence. It follows that stationarity of real exchange
rates in our sample of countries is conditional on the possibility of adjust-
ments in nominal exchange rates. Since this flexibility does not exist within
EMU, differences in price competitiveness between member states may last
for quite a long time. This is the more so as there are still marked differ-
ences in inflationary dynamics — hence, in the propagation of shocks — be-
tween member states of EMU, which further complicate the pursuit of a
common monetary policy. These findings lead us to conclude that the euro
area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for
continued structural reforms in European labour and product markets.7
We acknowledge that our findings are based on a simple model of infla-
tion dynamics, especially where the formation of expectations is concerned.
The results are also prone to the Lucas critique. Indeed, the empirical evi-
dence produced in this paper supports the view of Taylor (2000) and others
that the inflationary environment tends to alter the shape of the Phillips
curve. It may well be, therefore, that the influence of real exchange rates
(and other factors) on regional inflation levels will increase in the unlikely
7 See Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2001) for a theoretical underpinning of this
proposition.
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event that the euro area runs into persistently higher inflation zones.
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Table 1
Estimation resultsa
α1 α2 R¯ 2 S¯ e π¯β γ δ
Sample 1980-2000
France 0.90 0.02 0.11 0.03 -3.83 0.98 0.51 3.89
(20.3) (0.4) (2.2) (1.9) (2.7)
Germany 0.78 0.09 0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.91 0.47 2.44
(8.7) (1.2) (1.6) (0.1) (0.0)
Italy 0.94 -0.01 0.28 -0.00 -1.89 0.98 0.80 7.33
(15.7) (0.1) (2.1) (0.2) (0.8)
Netherlands 0.76 0.11 0.05 -0.02 0.85 0.78 0.80 2.06
(6.7) (1.5) (3.4) (0.6) (0.3)
Spain 0.51 0.80 0.28 -0.04 2.63 0.85 1.21 6.80
(3.8) (3.3) (1.3) (1.6) (0.9)
Pooled 0.91 0.08 0.02 -0.01 - b 0.96 0.86 4.75
(52.2) (3.0) (2.6) (1.5)
Sample 1990-2000
France 0.87 0.00 0.07 0.02 -2.14 0.87 0.32 1.67
(3.5) (0.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.6)
Germany 0.57 0.47 0.02 0.03 -3.09 0.92 0.48 2.17
(5.2) (2.8) (0.3) (1.2) (1.3)
Italy 0.91 0.27 -0.19 -0.02 3.93 0.91 0.67 4.29
(8.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0)
Netherlands 0.14 0.14 0.02 -0.05 5.65 0.55 0.43 2.12
(0.8) (2.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.9)
Spain 0.42 0.81 0.31 -0.03 2.04 0.63 1.25 4.45
(1.4) (2.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.4)
Pooled 0.72 0.23 0.03 0.00 - c 0.84 0.80 2.94
(12.8) (6.0) (2.6) (0.2)
a T-ratios in brackets; R¯ 2 is the coefficient of determination and S¯ e is the standard
error of estimate, both adjusted for degrees of freedom; π¯ is the sample mean of
gdp-inflation.
b Varies across countries (Fr: 0.65; Ge: 0.41; It: 1.10; Nl: 0.42: Sp: 0.99).
c Varies across countries (Fr: -0.61; Ge: -0.58; It: 0.07; Nl: -0.70: Sp: 0.26).
